Criminal Law - Effective Assitance of Counsel - Burden of Proof - Fields v. Peyton, 375 F.2d 624 (4th Cir. 1967) by Friend, Charles E.
William & Mary Law Review
Volume 9 | Issue 2 Article 16
Criminal Law - Effective Assitance of Counsel -
Burden of Proof - Fields v. Peyton, 375 F.2d 624
(4th Cir. 1967)
Charles E. Friend
Copyright c 1967 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr
Repository Citation
Charles E. Friend, Criminal Law - Effective Assitance of Counsel - Burden of Proof - Fields v. Peyton, 375
F.2d 624 (4th Cir. 1967), 9 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 525 (1967), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/
vol9/iss2/16
CURRENT DECISIONS
limits of the circumstances before the court in determining a claim
peculiar to admiralty.2s It is a subject of conjecture, as to the ultimate
effect of the decision upon the field of maritime torts, where previously
contribution has been granted only in collision cases. Perhaps a recon-
sideration has begun within the law of admiralty due to the inequities
resultant in a failure to share in the payment of joint tort liability where
each is as unintentionally responsible as the other. Such a development
would indeed be in line with the well-accepted theory of apportion-
ment of damages in cases of comparative negligence. It would appear
that, rather than wait upon congressional action, the courts have be-
gun to remedy the injustices reached by a broad application of the rule
in Halcyon. At the very least, the court has filled a gap, heretofore
untouched in the ancient remedy of cure and maintenance to injured
seamen.
Thomas D. Home
Criminal Law-EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL-BURDEN OF
PROOF. While serving a sentence in a State Convict Road Force Camp
in Bedford County, Virginia, James Fields escaped from custody. He
was recaptured within an hour and placed in the county jail, where
he was held for twelve days. During this period an indictment was re-
turned against him for escape and statutory burglary,' but no one dis-
cussed the charges with him prior to the date of his trial. When he was
brought into the courtroom to be tried, the presiding judge appointed
an attorney to defend him. After a brief consultation with this attorney
in the rear of the courtroom, Fields pleaded guilty and received sen-
tences totaling six years.'
Fields subsequently petitioned the circuit court for a writ of habeas
corpus, contending that he had been denied the effective assistance of
counsel by virtue of the last-minute appointment. The circuit court
granted the writ but was reversed by the Virginia Supreme Court of
25. Id., at 582.
. During his hour of freedom, Fields entered a building described in the record only
as "a cabin," apparently to hide from his pursuers. The paucity of information regarding
this charge was later made the subject of comment by the federal court. Fields v.
Peyton, 375 F.2d 624, 629 (4th Cir. 1967).
2. The total elapsed time between appointment of counsel and sentencing by the
court was estimated at fifteen to thirty minutes. The petitioner testified that the ap-
pointed attorney did not question him as to the facts of the case, and did not ask if he
was guilty, prior to recommending a guilty plea. Fields v. Peyton, 375 F.2d 624, 625-6
(4th Cir. 1967).
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Appeals.3 The prisoner then petitioned the United States District Court
for a federal writ of habeas corpus, which was denied. The Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the District Court, holding that an
implication of denial of effective assistance of counsel and due process
was inherent in the circumstances of the case, and that the failure of the
prosecution to introduce evidence to refute this implication required that
the sentence be invalidated and habeas corpus granted.4
The case highlights a conflict between state and federal law in the
Fourth Circuit. The basic proposition, that the right to counsel means
the right to. effective counsel, is not disputed.' It has been specifically
recognized in both the federal courts6 and in Virginia. 7 In addition,
both the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals and the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals have held that the appointment of counsel too soon
before trial may constitute denial of effective counsel.8
The conflict arises, however, in the assignment of the burden of
proof. Under the Virginia rule, as applied by the Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals in Peyton v. Fields, the petitioner seeking release on
grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel has the burden of proving
his contention that his case was thus prejudiced," and this proof must be
by a preponderance of the evidence.10 This position is in accordance
3. Peyton v. Fields, 207 Va. 40, 147 S.E.2d 762 (1966). Noted in 8 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 308 (1966).
4. Fields v. Peyton, 375 F.2d 624 (4th Cir. 1967).
5. The concept of effective assistance of counsel was first articulated in Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), and has since been developed and clarified in numerous
cases, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
6. See, e.g., Mitchell v. United States, 259 F.2d 787 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 358
U.S. 850 (1958).
7. See, e.g., Morris v. Smyth, 202 Va. 832, 120 S.E.2d 465 (1961), cert. denied, 371
U.S. 849 (1962).
8. See Whitley v. Cunningham, 205 Va. 251, 135 S.E.2d 823 (1964), holding that where
counsel was appointed on the morning of the trial and spent an hour or less in pre-
paring defendant's case, defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel, and Turner
v. Maryland, 318 F.2d 852 (4th Cit. 1963), wherein it was said that, when the initial
conference between defendant and his court-appointed attorney is held only a short
time before trial, ". . . we should be obliged to treat the lawyer's representation as
inadequate and the trial as falling short of the standards of due process guaranteed by
the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 854, quoted with approval in Martin v. Virginia,
365 F.2d 549 (4th Cir. 1966).
9. "It is also well settled that one serving a sentence in the penitentiary who seeks
his release by habeas corpus on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel has the
burden of proving the charge made." Peyton v. Fields, 207 Va. 40, 44; 147 S.E.2d 762
(1966).
10. Id. "The denial of petitioner's constitutional rights must be proved by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence."
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with the overwhelming weight of case law in both state and federal
jurisdictions."
Under the rule applied by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, how-
ever, a "mere showing" of the late time of appointment of counsel shifts
the burden of proof to the state. 12 The Court takes the position that there
is a "presumption of harm" which arises from the bare fact of the late
appointment of counsel.13 It appears that, unless this "presumption of
harm" is refuted by affirmative evidence appearing in the record itself,
the prosecution must carry the burden of proving that the defendant's
claim of prejudice is unjustified. 4 This view appears to have only limited
support in federal case law.' 5
11. In support of the Virginia rule, see Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271, 279 (1945);
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468-9 (1938); Bostic v. Rives, 107 F.2d 649 (D.C. Cir.
1939), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 664 (1940); United States ex rel. Jefferson v. Fay, 364 F.2d
15 (1st Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1027 (1967); United States ex rel. Marshall v.
Wilkins, 338 F.2d 404 (2nd Cir. 1964); Palumbo v. State or New Jersey, 334 F.2d 524
(3d Cir. 1964); Williams v. Babineaux, 357 F.2d 481 (5th Cit. 1966); Von Moltke v.
Gillies, 161 F.2d 113 (6th Cir. 1947), reV'd on other grounds, 332 U.S. 708 (1948);
Piner v. United States, 222 F.2d 199 (7th Cir. 1955); Maye v. Pescor, 162 F.2d 641
(8th Cir. 1947); Wilson v. Rose, 366 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1966); Roscoe v. Hunter, 144
F.2d 91 (10th Cir. 1942); Johnson v. Crouse, 191 Kan. 694, 383 P.2d 978 (1963); Goodlet
v. Goodman, 34 N.J. 358, 169 A.2d 140, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 855 (1961); Clark v.
Page, 384 P.2d 405 (Okla. Crim. 1963); Commonwealth ex rel. Dion v. Tees, 180 Pa.
Super. 82, 118 A.2d 756, cert. denied, 351 U.S. 914 (1956); State ex rel. Burns v.
Erickson, 80 S.D. 639, 129 N.W.2d 712 (1964); State ex rel. Clark v. Adams, 144 W. Va.
771, 111 S.E.2d 336 (1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 807 (1960). See also 21 AM. JuR. 2d
Criminal Law §§ 319, 321 (1965); 25 AM. JUR. Habeas Corpus § 150 (1940); 9 M. J.
Habeas Corpus § 8 (1950); Annot., 74 AJL.R.2d 1390 (1960). In addition, the Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals, in denying Fields' petition, relied in part upon past de-
cisions of the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals, to wit: Horne v. Peyton, 356 F.2d 631 (4th
Cir. 1966); Root v. Cunningham, 344 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1965) Goodson v. Peyton, 351
F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1965); Snead v. Smyth, 273 F.2d 838 (4th Cit. 1959).
12. ".-.. A mere showing , . . of the late time of appointment constitutes a prima
facie case of denial of effective assistance of counsel, so that the burden of proving
lack of prejudice is shifted to the state." 375 F.2d at 628, quoting with approval
Twiford v. Peyton 372 F.2d 670 (4th Cir. 1967). (Emphasis supplied by the Court.)
The Court did not flatly state whether this was a total rejection of the Virginia rule,
or merely a modification or extension of it.
13. 375 F.2d at 628.
14. Id. In his opinion, Judge Sobeloff distinguished the Court's previous decision in
Dawson v. Peyton, 359 F.2d 149 (4th Cir. 1966) (which was relied upon by the District
court in its approval of the decision of the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals) by
pointing out that in the Dawson case the record contained "adequate affirmative
evidence to overcome the presumption of harm" from the late appointment of counsel.
375 F.2d at 628. Judge Sobeloff declared that the Dawson case did not place the burden
of proof on the defendant. Id. at 626.
15. The federal Court of Appeals cited no authority for its position except its own
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Furthermore, as pointed out by the Federal Court of Appeals in the
instant case, the Supreme Court of the United States has declared that
while a federal District Court may accept the state court's findings of
fact in a habeas corpus proceeding, federal law must be applied when
the petition is heard in the federal court.'
The decision in Fields v. Peyton would therefore require that the
federal District Court hereafter apply the Fourth Circuit rule (shifting
the burden of proof to the prosecution) in hearings on habeas corpus
petitions directed to the federal courts after dismissal in the Virginia
courts. Since the federal courts have demonstrated an increasing readi-
ness to review habeas corpus petitions by state prisoners, 17 the Fields
decision has placed the Virginia courts in the position of having either
to alter their current rule as to burden of proof, or face frequent
reversal.
If the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals maintains its present posi-
tion without modification, and no clarification or reconciliation of the
apparent conflict is forthcoming from the federal courts, repetitions of
the result in Fields may be expected.
Charles E. Friend
Constitutional Law-Criminal Law-RIGHT OF AN ACCUSED TO THE
PRESENCE OF COUNSEL AT A POST-INDICTMENT LINE-UP. In United States
v. Wade,' defendant was indicted for the robbery of a federally in-
sured bank in Eustace, Texas. After indictment, and without notice to
Wade's court appointed attorney, defendant was exhibited in a police
line-up before two bank employees who had witnessed the holdup.
The line-up took place six months after the robbery, and defendant was
placed in a position whereby he could be seen alone by the witnesses
before the line-up began. In Gilbert v. California,2 a companion case,
previous decisions. See, however, Mosley v. Dutton, 367 F.2d 913 (5th Cir. 1966),
wherein it was said that, upon showing that the petitioner was jailed without pre-
liminary hearing, held incommunicado for four months, appointed counsel three days
before trial, and convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without a
single witness being offered in his defense, and later requested appeal but no appeal
was prosecuted, the burden of proof was shifted to the prosecution to show that his
cause was not thereby prejudiced.
16. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963), cited in Fields v. Peyton, 375 F.2d 624,
626 (4th Cir. 1967).
17. For a discussion of this trend, see Note, Judicial Intervention in Prison Ad-
ministration, 9 WM. & MARY L. Rtv. 178 (1967).
1. 87 S.Ct. 1926 (1967).
2. 87 S.Ct. 1951 (1967).
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